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ALUMNI COMMENT
VIRGINIA EXTENDS ENTIRETIES DOCTRINE
JOSEPH L. LYLE, JR.*
Of the common law estates in real property presently extant in
Virginia, the tenancy by the entirety is, with some cause, easily the
most controversial. The ranks of its critics are growing daily; thwarted
creditors insist that to employ the estate as a means to insulate ostens-
ible assets from individual' creditors is to indulge in the basest de-
ceit. However, the judicial reply has, tacitly at least, been that these
critics should seek their redress in the legislative rather than the judi-
cial chambers.2
As a practical matter, the tenancy by the entirety possesses three
distinctive, though interrelated characteristics: (1) The incident of
survivorship; (2) the incident of unity, that is, that the property is
not severable by the sole act of one spouse and is not subject to par-
tition; and (3) the incident of creditor immunization, that is, that
whatever may have been the relative contribution between the spouses,
the creditor of one spouse can subject no part of -the estate to his
individual debt. It is the third characteristic which has given rise to
the present barrage of criticism.
*Partner, Hickson, Davies & Lyle, Lynchburg, Virginia. B.A. 1958, LL.B. 196o.
Washington and Lee University.
1An estate by the entirety may not be reached by the creditors of only the
husband or only the wife. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E.2d 599 (1951).
But the estate is subject to the claims of creditors of the husband and the wife who
are jointly indebted. 2 Minor Law of Real Property § 854 (2d ed. 1928), and such
estate constitutes an asset in a bankruptcy proceeding or proceedings filed by both
spouses. In re Reid, 198 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Va. 1961), note, 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
297 (1962), aff'd Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1962).2T'his writer has found no satisfactory answer to the question of whether com-
mon law dogma should be abrogated or modified by the judiciary, or whether this is
purely a legislative function. As a practical matter, the answer depends in large
part on the inclination of the court concerned. As said in a quotation from C. J. S.
approved by the Virginia court in Midkiff v. Midkiff, 20oi Va. 829, 832, 113 S.E.2d
875 (196o); "'The common law does not consist of definite rules which are absolute,
fixed, and immutable like the statute law, but it is a flexible body of principles which
are designed to meet, and are susceptible of adaptation to, new institutions, condi-
tions, usages, and practices, as the progress of society may require.'"
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The critics were recently given some further grounds for concern
when the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided the case of
Oliver v. Givens,3 in which the creditor immunization feature of the
tenancy by the entirety was extended, at least beyond the limits previ-
ously delineated by the case law of this Commonwealth.
In the Oliver case, the court was confronted with these facts:
In 1954, H and W acquired real estate "as tenants by the entireties
with the right of survivorship as at common law." On February 23,
1959, H and W contracted to sell the property. On May 29, 1959, the
sale was consummated and the deed to the purchaser was recorded. On
July 2, 1959, the realtor who closed the sale delivered to W a check for
the net purchase price, which W deposited to her credit in a local
bank. On the same day, W drew a check on this account for part of
this sum in payment of the purchase price for other real estate which,
in November, 1959, was conveyed by deed to W. In a subsequent bank-
ruptcy proceeding filed by H, the issue arose as to whether H's inter-
est in the sales proceeds ever constituted assets which could be reached
by his individual creditors. The issue was tried by an action in the
state court instituted by the trustee in bankruptcy. The trial court
held that the sales proceeds, once they were severed from the realty,
paid to W and placed in W's bank account, lost their characteristics
as entireties property and that one-half could be reached by H's cred-
itors. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the trial court
and entered final judgment for W, holding specifically that the sales
proceeds at all times retained their characteristics as entireties prop-
erty, and were hence immune from the claims of H's individual credi-
tors.
In order to place this case in proper perspective, it is well to trace
the development of the tenancy by the entirety at common law and
in Virginia, through the statutes and leading case constructions which
have molded it.
At common law, it is said, "the husband and wife were one person,
and that person was the husband." The interspousal unity was so
strong that Lord Coke wrote:
"[T]he husband and wife cannot take by moieties during the
coverture."
4
Thus it developed that virtually any estate created between hus-
2o04 Va. 123, 129 S.E.2d 661 (1963).
'Coke on Littleton, § 299 B (Notes by Hargrave and Butler 1853).
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band and wife, where the four unities were present,5 resulted in a ten-
ancy by the entirety. This constituted the common law of this Com-
monwealth. 6
From this time-honored presumption favoring the tenancy by the
entirety, there began a process of statutory modification. In 1850, the
General Assembly enacted a statute abolishing survivorship between
husband and wife unless "it manifestly appeared from the tenor of
the instrument -that the part of the one dying should belong to the sur-
vivor."7 In 1877, the Married Women's Property Act8 was enacted,
which placed the wife in a more realistic legal position, consistent with
her changing role in society. In 1888, an act was passed which provided
that if any estate be conveyed or devised to husband and wife, they
shall take and hold the same by moieties as if a distinct moiety had
been given to each by a separate conveyance. 9
The leading modem Virginia decisions have generally reached
constructions which favor the tenancy by the entirety. In Allen v.
Parkey,o the court was called upon to construe a deed to H and W
which specified that the survivor was to take the whole, but which
made no specific mention of a tenancy by the entirety. The court held
that since the survivorship feature was obvious from the tenor of the
instrument, a tenancy by the entirety was created, and partition was
not compellable."' In Burroughs v. Gorman,12 real property was con-
'At common law, the creation of a joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety
presupposed the existence of the four unities of time, title, interest and possession.
See 2 Minor, Law of Real Property §§ 839-843, 852-857 (2d ed. 1928).
OSee Thornton v. Thornton, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 179 (1825), wherein it was held
that a will devising real property to H and W and their heirs forever, created a
tenancy by the entirety, and on the death of W, H became seized of the fee. See
also Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 US. 464 (1888).
Wirginia Code c. 116, § 18 (1849), now Va. Code Ann. § 55-21 (Repl. Vol. 1959).
'Va. Acts 1877, c. 329, now Va. Code Ann. § 55-36 (Repl. Vol. 1959).
O'This enactment is presently reflected in Va. Code Ann. § 55-2o (Repl. Vol.
1959), which provides, in part: "[A]nd if hereafter any estate, real or personal, be
conveyed or devised to a husband and his wife, they shall take and hold the same
by moieties in like manner as if a distinct moiety had been given to each by a
separate conveyance." Of course, this statute is limited by and must be read
together with § 55-21, which provides: "The preceding Section shall not apply to
any estate which joint tenants have as executors or trustees, nor to any estate
conveyed or devised to persons in their own right when it manifestly appears from
the tenor of the instrument that it was intended the part of the one dying should
then belong to the others...."
'0154 Va. 739, 149 S.E. 615 (1929).
"The contention was rejected that H and W were joint tenants with the right
of survivorship and that therefore under § 52-9 of the Code of 1919, now Va. Code
Ann. § 8-69o (Repl. Vol. 1957), "Joint tenants. . shall be compelled to make par-
tition."
2156 Va. 8, 184 S.E. 174 (1936).
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veyed to H and W "as joint tenants with the common-law right of
survivorship." The court extended the doctrine laid down in Allen
v. Parkey and held that a tenancy by the entirety, not a joint tenancy,
was created, and that W could not compel partition. In Vasilion v.
Vasilion13 the court reaffirmed the sanctity of the tenancy by the en-
tirety in Virginia, and its immunization from individual creditors.
All of the foregoing cases had dealt with the entireties doctrine
as applicable to real property. The troublesome question of the
extent to which the estate could exist in personal property had never
been resolved in Virginia, until ig6o, when the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia decided the case of Moore
v. Gotzbach.14 In this case the Internal Revenue Service, judgment
creditor of H, was denied the right to levy on rents from real estate
owned by H and W as tenants by the entirety.15 The funds, however,
had not yet been realized and were still in the hands of the tenant
so the District Court was not confronted with the question decided
in Oliver v. Givens, and expressly declined to decide this question. The
District Court stated: "We do not have the problem as to when the rent
ceases to be entirety property under the facts of this case. It had never
been paid by the tenant of the property to either the plaintiff or her
husband. It retained its original character at all times."' 6
This question was clearly placed before the Supreme Court of
Appeals in Oliver v. Givens. The court's unanimous answer was that
the sales proceeds from real estate held by the entireties retained
a creditor-immune characteristic even though they had been paid di-
rectly to the wife, placed in the wife's separate bank account, and
used over four months later to purchase real estate in the sole name
of the wife.' 7 The court's reasoning, briefly, ran as follows:
"It is true, as the lower court held, that the sale of the real
estate which the husband and wife owned as tenants by the
"192 Va. 735, 66 S.E.2d 599 (1951).
u 188 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Va. 196o).15An excellent annotation appears in 64 A.L.R.2d 8 (1959), which indicates that,
although there is considerable authority to the contrary, a majority of jurisdictions
have concluded that, absent statute, a tenancy by the entirety may exist in personal
property.
88 F. Supp. at 269.
27In 64 A.L.R.2d at 47-57 there is an excellent discussion of the extent to
which the entireties estate is impressed on proceeds from the voluntary sale of
entireties real estate. Cases which hold that the proceeds are entireties property are
cited from twelve jurisdictions, while cases from five jurisdictions are cited for a
contrary result. No conclusion, however, is reached as to what act or event, if any,
will terminate the entireties character of the funds. It would seem that the nature
of the dominion and use of the funds would affect their character.
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entireties terminated such an estate in that property .... But it
does not follow that an estate by the entireties does not exist
in the proceeds of the sale of such property .... [W]e hold that
in the present case the proceeds of the sale of the Laurel Glen
property, which the husband and wife had owned as tenants by
the entireties, were likewise owned and held by them as tenants
by the entireties. That being so, the husband's interest therein
was free of or immune from the claims of his creditors."'u
The Virginia court summarily rejected the contentions that: (i)
a tenancy by the entirety should not be deemed to exist in personal
property; (2) even if it did exist in personal property, the estate does
not exist unless the affirmative intention of the parties to create the
the estate is clearly manifested; and (3) the funds were severed from
the realty, and converted to the wife's sole dominion, -thus resulting
in a tenancy in common by operation of law.19
Aside from the moral issue which is inextricably involved, this
case would appear to extend the entireties doctrine beyond its an-
ticipated limits as laid down by the precedents of this state. The
court was squarely presented with the opportunity to set a limit on
the operation of this peculiar characteristic of the tenancy by the
entirety; instead it chose to amplify its effect. In our present legal
climate, and until some boundaries, be they judicial or legislative,
are delineated for the operation of the tenancy by the entirety, it
is possible for vast commercial and industrial properties to be ac-
cumulated, sold and re-accumulated with relative immunity from the
claims of creditors. The problem is deeply interwoven with public
policy considerations. Perhaps, as the court has said, the legislature is
the proper declarant of public policy. It is submitted that, to which-
ever forum public policy is to be entrusted, some definitive action is
in order to curtail the wide implications of this embattled estate.
eo4 Va. at 126-27; 129 S.E.2d at 663.
"Interestingly, the argument might still be made that the wife holds the newly
acquired property, not in fee simple, but as a tenant by the entirety, at least to
the extent that the entireties proceeds can be traced to its purchase. See Frost v.
Frost, 2oo Mo. 474, 98 S.W. 527 (196o).
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